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Henry Kissinger this morning gave us highlights his impressions as result conversations last three days on Nassau, Jupiter withdrawal and related matters, with Segni, Fanfani, Andreotti, La Malfa, Cattani, Nenni and Lombardi. He will also see Malagodi and Moro before leaving for Washington today, and we may have more to report. Doubtless because Kissinger is not (repeat not) US Government official and yet is close to administration and is highly informed expert on these matters, Italians evidently expressed their views more frankly and freely than they have to us, and it seems clear his visit at this time provided sort of lightning rod to attract somewhat emotional Italian reactions.

Regarding Jupiter withdrawal (which he did not raise with them), Kissinger felt that all with whom he spoke accepted US reasons for withdrawal "intellectually" and nobody thinking of actually opposing withdrawal, but they were concerned Italy would lose its current "one-up" position among non-nuclear alliance members. PSI leaders Nenni and Lombardi made clear removal of missiles would be welcome. President Segni was

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much concerned about domestic political implications and Neutralist trend of Fanfani Government, covering same ground he had with Ambassador January 13 (EMBTL 1367) and, in addition, expressing pique that US decision on withdrawal had apparently been made during Cuban crisis and Italy only informed three months later. In most conversations Kissinger found similar reaction that Italy is faced more or less with fait accompli which, though technically justified, ignored local political repercussions. This ascribed widely to technical approach and "tone" of McNamara letter to Andreotti. "Almost everyone", according to Kissinger, suspected that withdrawal might be result of US agreement with Russians, some pointing to April 1 date as evidence. Fanfani, Andreotti and Cattani emphasized importance of some counterpart, such as putting polaris or garibaldy, as solution to political problem.

As regards MLF, Kissinger found widespread support for concept but little consideration of possible means for implementation, beyond apparent desire that it be seaborne, and skepticism (especially by Andreotti and Cattani) of feasibility multinational manning approach. According to Cattani, Fanfani had commented privately US would merely allow Italy provide "the cooks" but that he (Fanfani) saw little Italy could do but try to upgrade its participation to extent feasible. Nenni and Lombardi explicitly supported Italian participation in a broad MLF effort as an approach offering opportunity to contain proliferation of national nuclear capabilities with possibility of ultimately absorbing present French as well as British national efforts. (They also expressed their pro-US orientation generally, and Nenni listed at length his "errors" over past decade.) Cattani was least enthusiastic over MLF, admitting nevertheless he was unaware of any more attractive alternative. He reportedly thought De Gaulle's general attitude toward US both understandable and reasonable, noting that De Gaulle alone had the stuff to tell US what it needs be told. Cattani said he found unimpressive the technical suggestions presented by the Smith-Lee team. Having obviously misunderstood our intention that these briefings be explorer question-and-answer sessions.

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